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Notes
VALIDITY OF ALLOTMENT ORDER UNDER LUMBER CODE; SUSPENSION OF PENAL
PROVISIONS AS TO LITIGANT CHALLENGING ORDER
A TEMrPORARY allotment order was issued under the N. R. A. Lumber Code, limiting
each of the 480 mills in the West Coast Division to a 30 hour operating week.1 The
mills operating one shift were thus restricted to 60% of capacity, but production in
the 67 mills employing two shifts was reduced to 30% of potential capacity. The Re-
covery Act imposes a $500 per day penalty for each violation of a code provision, and
the Lumber Code further provides that should any person exceed his allotment the
offender's subsequent allotments shall be diminished by an amount equal to such ex-
cess. Complainant, owner of a two shift mill, appealed to the code administration for
modification of the order, and upon failure to obtain relief brought suit in the federal
District Court to enjoin the Lumber Code agencies2 from enforcing the allotment and
imposing the penalties. The order was claimed to effect an arbitrary discrimination
against mills operating two shifts and to deprive them of property without due pro-
cess of law; the penalties accumulating during suit were challenged as an excessive
burden on the right to test the validity of the order. A temporary injunction was
granted as requested, but upon further hearing was dissolved in so far as it restrained
enforcement of the allotment provisions. The order was considered the most equit-
able distribution of employment and profits that could be devised in the almost bank-
rupt industry.3 But the court questioned the validity of penalizing complainant so
severely for bringing suit, and continued the order restraining the Lumber Code
agencies from enforcing such penalties4 pending further investigation of their con-
stitutionality.5
The decision that the allotment order does not violate due process can hardly be
questioned. The purpose of the Recovery Act is, so far as possible, to "overcome un-
employment and disorganization of industry."6  Greater sacrifices are, perhaps, re-
quired of complainant than of one shift mill owners, 7 but to favor two shift mills be-
cause of past production history and larger capacity would require greater limitation
in operating time of other mills and thus destroy uniformity of employment and op-
portunity for profits within the industry as a whole. The allotment is not unconstitu-
1. Issued August 30, 1933 for the period September 4, 1933 to September 30, 1933.
2. The members of the divisional code administration and the federal district attorney.
3. In 1933 one-half of the normal manufacturing capacity was idle, and one-third of
the sawmill companies were in the process of liquidation or under the control of re-
ceivers or trustees. Employment dropped from 95,000 in 1929 to 30,100 in 1933; daily
wages fell 62.1% from 1926 levels. (Figures taken from the instant decision, infra note 5.)
4. The restraint on specific penalties, however, still permits the government to enforce
the allotment through the injunctive clause of the Recovery Act. P. L. No. 67, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1933) § 3 (c).
5. Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Watzek, U. S. Law Week, Feb. 6, 1934, at 39 (D
Ore. 1934). No claim was made that control of production was in itself unconstitutional;
this point was therefore not discussed.
6. Quoted from the instant decision, supra note 5. This factor should weigh heavily
in determining the validity of the order. Cf. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 513 (1922).
7. Special equipment may be essential to two-shift production.
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tional merely because complainant receives less benefits from the order than do others.
Assessments of railway property for civic improvements are not invalid although
they benefit the railroad comparatively little,8 and contributions to a bank deposit
guaranty fund may be demanded of conservatively run banks even though the chief
beneficiaries of such a fund are institutions more speculatively managed.9 Nor do the
greater sacrifices required of the two shift mills constitute the order a violation of the
Fifth Amendment. A flat 10% reduction of insurance rates, regardless of the varying
earning capacities of the companies concerned has been declared constitutional;' 0 a
requirement that persons drilling for oil must secure a surety company bond has been
approved despite the fact that the expense involved was prohibitory to some and not
to others." The due process clause, as a general rule, will protect property from con-
fiscation; 12 beyond this, however, sharp discriminations are permissible if made in the
public interest. In rate regulation, for example, the federal government must allow the
railroads a "non-confiscatory" return,'5 yet the surplus may be expropriated for the
purpose of loaning or giving it to weaker roads;' 4 zoning ordinances have been ap-
proved which destroyed half the value of land, 15 although complete condemnation
would necessitate compensation; and use of the taxing power has been permitted
arbitrarily to impose uniform production on salmon canneries, regardless of past or
present production capacity, so long as profit was still possible. 16 Applying this rule
to the instant case, it appears that the allotment order does not violate due process,
for it permits complainant to operate with some, though lessened profits, 1 7 and is dis-
criminatory if at all' 8 in the furtherance of public welfare. The familiar doctrine that
8. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877); Branson v. Bush, 251 U. S. 182 (1919).
Plaintiff claims due process as found in the Fifth Amendment is violated. Decisions
interpreting the same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment are in point, as the restraint
imposed on legislation in each is the same. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
9. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911).
10. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde, 275 U. S. 440 (1928). A rate which prevents a
utility from undercutting a popular competitor to the disadvantage of the less patronized
company is valid. Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U. S.
130 (1933).
11. Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U. S. 98 (1933).
12. Special circumstances permit indirect confiscation, as when property is used for anti-
social purposes. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. . 623 (1887).
13. A "non-confiscatory return" guaranteed by due process is not necessarily a com-
mercially profitable one. See Columbus Gas and Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus, 17 F.
(2d) 630, 641 (S. D. Ohio 1927); Lilienthal, Recent Developments In The Law of Public
Utility Holding Companies (1931) 31 COL. L. Rv. 189, 204 (footnote quoting Mr. Justice
Brandeis).
14. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923) (gifts); Dayton-Goose Creek
Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924) (loans).
15. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
16. Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269 (1925). Also in point is the
power of the Federal Radio Commission to allot as equally as possible broadcasting privi-
leges in disregard of priority in the field and broadcasting capacity. Federal Radio Com-
mission v. Nelson Brothers, 289 U. S. 266 (1933).
17. Assumed from an apparent failure to show the contrary.
18. A uniform allotment is hardly discriminatory. It need not operate with uniform
fairness. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 204 (1912); Hebe Co. v. Shaw,
248 U. S. 297, 303 (1919); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 500 (1919).
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in an emergency private interests may be more greatly restricted than at other times' 9
is hardly necessary to support this decision. 20 The approved power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to cripple certain industries by giving preferences in the
public interest to products of others when an emergency arises, 2' is a power far in
excess of that exercised in the present uniform allotment of production.
22
A more difficult question is raised by the continuing injunction restraining the en-
forcement of penalties. The court recognized that a penal clause is unconstitutional
if it inflicts an undue burden on a litigant who violates the law while testing its val-
idity,2 3 and apparently considered the Recovery Act penalties accumulating during
the suit as excessive in this respect. But the hesitancy of the court to pass upon the
legality of the provisions evidences a belief that its choice lies between two undesirable
alternatives: to emasculate these in terrorem features of the Recovery Act merely be-
cause in this case their application would be unconstitutional,2 4 or to preserve the vital
weapons of enforcement and cause complainant to be unduly punished for litigation
brought in good faith. It is submitted, however, that the court could refuse to inval-
idate the penal clauses and at the same time, through enjoining the collection of pen-
alties, suspend their operation as to complainant for the period of litigation.
19. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); cf. Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U. S.
253 (1929) (greater discretion permitted under war powers). Due process should be
interpreted in the light of present conditions. Cf. In re Debbs, 158 U. S. 564, 591 (1895) ;
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394 (1915).
The depression is recognized as such an emergency. Home Building and Loan Association
v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934).
20. Especially in view of the customary rules of refusal to pass on the policy of legis-
lation, Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 608, 609 (1903); Gant v. Oklahoma City, supra note
11, at 102; Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra note 19, including
administrative orders, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 215
U. S. 452, 470 (1910); and of presuming the validity of statutes, O'Gorman and Young
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251, 257, 258 (1931), and administrative orders,
cf. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U. S. 552, 563 (1905); Los Angeles Gas and Electric
Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S. 287, 305 (1933); and of upholding legislation as
constitutional where reasonable men differ, Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, 289 U. S. 36, 42 (1933).
21. The restriction of coal shipments to favor certain industries in accordance with
this statute has been upheld. Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1924).
22. A claim presented by complainant was that this allotment would prevent fulfillment
of contracts, and that he would thus be liable for damages. A contract duty is discharged,
however, if a law prevents performance. CoNTRA Ts RESTAT~r.zENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 458,
quoted with approval in Operators' Oil Co. v. Barbre, 65 F. (2d) 857 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
N. R. A. or A. A. A. orders approved to date on grounds of due process include restric-
tion of peach canning production, United States v. Calistan Packers, 4 F. Supp. 660 (N. D.
Cal. 1933), fixing of milk prices, Capital City Milk Producers' Association v. Wallace,
U. S. Law Week, Nov. 21, 1933, at 5 (D. C. Sup. Ct. 1933), and prohibition of premiums
in the Oil Code, Victor v. Ickes, U. S. Law Week, Dec. 5, 1933, at 6 (D. C. Sup. Ct.
1933); United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., U. S. Law Week, Feb. 20, 1934, at
7 (N. D. Ill. 1934) (but declaring it invalid as an invasion of a state's power).
23. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230
U. S. 340 (1913); see Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 215, 216 (1923).
24. The penalties are certainly not unreasonable in any respect other than penalizing
litigation, if indeed they are for that reason.
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Logically it may be controverted that equity can use its injunctive power to sus-
pend a penal clause for a limited period. An injunction is said to restrain enforce-
ment officials alone, the statute and accumulating penalties being unaffected and still
enforceable if the officers will risk contempt of court.20 Accordingly it has been held
that a temporary injunction restraining enforcement of an oil inspection law, pending
a suit attacking the validity of the act, merely prevented criminal prosecution, and
that the accumulated penalties were collectible when the injunction was vacated.2 6
Moreover, to permit temporary suspension of a penal clause is in effect to allow modifi-
cation of punishment fixed by legislation, a power forbidden the judiciary. 27 Never-
theless the courts have in practice suspended penal clauses. A decision holding a state
prohibition act unconstitutional was declared to have suspended the accumulation of
penalties when later the same court upheld the statute;2s retroactive suspension of a
penal tax law has been permitted when collection of penal interest, accumulating dur-
ing litigation, was enjoined at the termination of the suit; 29 and imposition of penal-
ties for violation of railway rate legislation has been absolutely suspended pending
the conclusion of a suit to test the validity of the law.30 Furthermore, the logical
obstacles to temporary suspension are not conclusive. The injunction, it is true,
restrains enforcement officials alone, but it may be viewed as binding them to con-
sider legislation inoperative during the injunction period, leaving as collectible only
those penalties arising during periods not covered by court order.31 Such a result
may be justified on either of two theories. If penalties are considered so severe a.,
to deny a constitutional right to test the validity of a statute, the court may be said
merely to enjoin the operation of the penalty provisions while they are invalid. Col-
lection of penalties contained in pipe line legislation has been enjoined to this limited
extent.3 2 When the constitutional requirement is satisfied, by the conclusion of the
suit, the injunction ceases to have effect and the penalties are revived.33 The other
25. See Ex parte Young, supra note 23, at 163.
26. State v. Vadhams Oil Co., 149 Wis. 58, 134 N. W. 1121 (1912); see Ray v. City
of Belton, 162 S. W. 1015 (Tex. 1914).
27. In re Graham, 138 U. S. 461, 462 (1891); In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242 (1894);
Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27 (1916); see United States v. Meldrum, 146 F.
390, 395 (D. Ore. 1906). Contra: People v. Stickle, 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497 (1909).
28. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910) (not involving the injunctive
power, however).
29. Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U. S. 773 (1879).
30. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 157 Fed. 944 (C. C.
M. D. Ala. 1907) (justified by statutory authorization and the inherent power of equity).
Likewise has the operation of penalties for contempt of a utility commission order been
prevented. New Hampshire Gas and Electric Co. v. Morse, 42 F. (2d) 490 (D. N. H.
1930).
31. This effects suspension. If enforcement officials are enjoined in reality the govern-
ment itself is bound to treat the legislation as inoperative. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172
U. S. 148, 169 (1898); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 526, 531 (1899).
32. Kern Trading and Oil Co. v. Associated Pipe Line Co., 217 Fed. 273 (N. D. Cal.
1914). Cf. Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277, 283 (1915) (inference as to power to
enjoin during "reasonable time" to prevent excessive penalties).
33. A state prohibition act, unconstitutional as interfering with interstate commerce,
becomes constitutional on passage of a Congressional act permitting such prohibition.
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
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theory presumes that the legislature did not intend to nullify its work by denying
a litigant the right to test the statute, and therefore, by suspension, exempts the
particular litigant from the penal clause on the ground that his situation was not
within the purview of the legislative intendment. In accord with this view a rail-
road contesting penal rate legislation was deemed to possess during the litigation an
exceptional status outside of the operation of the penal clause, and collection of
penalties otherwise imposed by the statute for this period was enjoined.3 4 In the
last analysis what is here urged is simply that the court could declare unconstitu-
tional application of the penalties to persons bringing a test case in good faith.
If it be determined that suspension of the Recovery Act penalties in the instant
case is desirable, this result can easily be attained. The past injunction restraining
enforcement of the penal provisions may be recognized as having had a suspensive
effect. 35 Or, if deemed necessary, a special injunction may be issued suspending the
penal clauses as to the particular penalties incurred during the litigation, by enjoining
their collection. 30
JUDICIAL INGENUITY AND A SOUTHERN STATE'S LIABILITY UPON CARPETBAG BONDS
IN State v. Woodruff,' the Supreme Court of Mississippi disposed finally of a com-
plaint which, filed originally in 1888, has been pending in the courts of the state for
forty-five years. This ancient litigation arose over the liability of the state upon a
million dollar bond issue which a carpetbag legislature had authorized in 1871,
2
allegedly to aid in the construction of certain levees. The bonds, which were secured
by taxes constituting a lien upon the lands owned by individuals in the district
concerned, were to mature in 1882. For the protection of the bondholders the
legislature provided that mandamus would lie against the administrative body of the
district to compel collection of the taxes, and that when collected the taxes would
constitute a trust fund for the payment of the bonds. But these remedies were of
little avail in the face of the almost negligible value of the land and of the futility
of attempting to collect the excessive taxes thereon; less than $21,000 was paid into
the district's treasury during the years immediately following issuance of the bonds.
With the downfall of the carpetbaggers, a systematic negation of their accomplish-
ments, culminating in the repudiation of the bonds and the enactment in 1884 of a
statute withdrawing the bondholders' remedies against the state,3 was undertaken by
the Democrats. The bondholders, failing to test the constitutionality of this act,
34. Coal and Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley and Avis, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (1910) (con-
taining exhaustive treatment of authorities supporting this theory). The case is quoted with
approval in Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651 (1915).
35. See note 30, supra.
36. See note 29, supra.
1. 150 So. 760 (liss. 1933).
2. Miss. Laws 1871, c. 1. The possibilities for graft inherent in the act are apparent.
Complete administration of the funds received from sale of the bonds was placed in the
hands of a board of commissioners whose power was subject to no supervision. The board
was authorized to appoint all necessary subordinate officers and agents, and to determine
their salaries, which were to be paid out of the levee fund. Id. §§ 1, 3, 25. It is significant
that, within two weeks after the carpetbaggers lost control of the legislature, this board
was abolished and its powers transferred to the public auditor. Miss. Laws 1876, c. 108.
3. Miss. Laws 1884, c. 168, § 30.
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filed the present bill in 1888 to enforce the trust against the state and against the
landowners both for taxes collected and for those due and uncollected. A demurrer
alleging that the bond issue was invalid, that the statute of limitations had run and
that the court had no jurisdiction, was overruled by the trial court solely upon the
first ground, and this decision was sustained by the state supreme court.4 On writ
of error to the United States Supreme Court, however, a divided Court reversed the
judgment and overruled the demurrer on the ground considered.5 From a second
hearing on the demurrer in the lower court another appeal to the state supreme
court was taken in 1899. The opinion of that court is so confused and unclear that
the members of the present court devoted tedious hours to its study before con-
cluding that it held that the liability of the landowners and of the state was not
limited to the taxes collected, but extended also to those that should have been
collected. 6 At this point the state's attorneys for the first time questioned the
jurisdiction of the court over the state-a fundamental issue, which, though raised
in the demurrer, had not been before discussed.1 Still on the demurrer, therefore,
the case was brought before the state supreme court again in 1903; in the face of
overwhelming authority to the contrary,8 the court in that year declared that, despite
the legislature's withdrawal of the remedies against the state in 1884, the state was
properly made a party defendant 9 Following this decision the case was referred
by the trial court to a master, and there it remained for more than a quarter of a
century as successive attorney-generals deferred examination of the voluminous
records. Finally, in 1.931 a report was rendered and an interlocutory decree entered
holding the landowners and the state liable for all the taxes collected and uncollected.
The appeal to the state supreme court was taken from that decree.10
The present Supreme Court of Mississippi, evincing some embarrassment over
4. Woodruff v. State, 66 Miss. 298, 6 So. 235 (1889).
S. Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 291 (1896). Three of the justices joined in a
dissenting opinion, and a fourth concurred with opinion.
6. Except for those claims barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. Woodruff v.
State, 77 Miss. 68, 25 So. 483 (1899).
7. Generally where the record is silent as to whether a particular ground for a demurrer
was argued, it will be deemed to have been waived. Baker v. Streater, 221 S. W. 1039
(Tex. 1920); Johnson v. Union National Bank of Houston, 242 S. W. 293 (Tex. 1922);
cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 158 Ala. 404, 47 So. 1008 (1908). However, the lack of a
court's jurisdiction over the state cannot be waived by the state's attorneys in the absence
of legislative authorization. Cf. O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927);
Owens v. State Highway Department, 163 S. E. 473 (S. C. 1932). Consequently the state
was entitled to a hearing at any time upon the issue of jurisdiction.
8. "Although the state may, at the inception of the contract, have consented as one
of its conditions to subject itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent and
resume its original immunity without any violation of its contract in the constitutional
sense." In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890)
(bonds); Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. S. 240 (1896) (bonds). A suit already pending
will be dismissed. South and North Alabama Rr. Co. v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832 (1879);
Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 231 (1875).
9. State v. Woodruff, 83 Miss. 111, 36 So. 79 (1903).
10. Appeal from an interlocutory decree is allowed in Mississippi. Miss. CODE (1930)
§ 14. Since the controlling principles of the present case were presumably settled in 1899,
the court, perhaps ironically, took jurisdiction in order "to avoid expense and delay."
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the lengthy history of this controversy, appears to have concluded that justice would
not be served by imposing the burden of the bonds upon the present generation of
landowners and taxpayers. With this conclusion in mind, the court turned first to
the case made against the landowners. Relief for these defendants was made readily
available by the discovery that the complaint in seeking to bring them before the
court named only "all persons claiming to own lands within the bounds" of the
district "and who are too numerous to be made defendants individually and to be
served with process"; the obviously fatal generality of this language 1 had inexplic-
ably escaped judicial notice for forty-five years. With equal facility the court also
dismissed the action against the few landowners who had been properly named and
served with process.12 But considerably greater difficulty was encountered in dealing
with the liability of the state.
If the present court could have repudiated the admittedly erroneous decision of
1903 holding the state subject to suit, its apparent purpose would have been readily
accomplished. But a question of law once determined by an appellate court ordinarily
becomes the law of the case, whether correct or not, and may not be redetermined
upon subsequent appeals in the same litigation except by a higher court.13 It could
be argued that when a state consents to be sued, no jurisdiction over the sovereign
"person" is given the court since no execution can be levied against the state; 14 but
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the state's moral obligation upon the plaintiff's
claim, is conferred on the proper court. Upon this analysis, withdrawal of the
consent would deprive the court of all jurisdiction.1 Thereafter, a decision that
the state could be sued would be a nullity16 and so could not constitute the law of the
case. This argument was apparently not pressed upon the court in the principal
case, however, and the conclusions followed that the 1903 decision controlled and
that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to maintain this action against the state.
Thwarted thus upon one approach, and on the other hand faced by its own inter-
11. New Orleans Land Co. v. Leader Realty Co., 255 U. S. 266 (1921); cf. Erskine v.
Gardiner, 162 La. 83, 110 So. 97 (1926). A court may on its own motion dismiss a bill
as to all persons not properly made parties to the suit. Progress Co. v. Salt Lake City, 53
Utah 556, 173 Pac. 705 (1918). The plaintiffs, not having alleged that the landowners were
unknown after a diligent search, were not entitled to constructive process by newspaper
publication. MIss. CODE (1930) § 2972. Probably the bondholders had given scant at-
tention to the liability of most of the landowners, since as late as 1888 the value of the land
was negligible.
12. Payment of taxes can be procured only in the manner provided by statute. Brachey
v. Peddicord, 199 Ky. 75, 250 S. W. 511 (1923); State v. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426, 6 So. 316
(1389); Enochs v. State, 128 Miss. 361, 91 So. 20 (1922). Mandamus, the remedy given
the plaintiffs by the Mississippi legislature in 1871, was never sought. The plaintiffs had
thus pursued the wrong remedy against these landowners.
13. Baldwin Star Coal Co. v. Quinn, 46 Colo. 590, 105 Pac. 1101 (1909). The rule
applies even though the decision is later overruled in a different case. Stonebaker v.
Ault, 59 Okla. 189, 158 Pac. 570 (1906).
14. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Chambers, 169 Cal. 131, 145 Pac.
1025 (1915).
15. After such withdrawal of consent, the court may not even pass upon the state's
moral obligation. Cf. McShane v. Murray, 106 Neb. 512, 184 N. W. 147 (1921).
16. Dix v. Dix, 132 Ga. 630, 64 S. E. 790 (1909); Lewis v. Lewis, 196 Ky. 701, 245 S.
W. 509 (1922).
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pretation of the 1899 decision as holding that the defendants' liability was not limited
to the amount of taxes actually collected, 17 the present Mississippi court evolved a
novel and ingenious solution of its dilemma. Disregarding the fact that it had itself
raised the issue for the first time on appeal, and overruling the vigorous dissent of
several of the judges, the court held that if the state were now forced to pay the
bondholders, the laches' s of its attorney generals would preclude its securing
reimbursement from the landowners whose lands were security for the taxes which
should have been collected; in such an action for reimbursement, the court declared,
the state would be suing as trustee and not as sovereign, and so would be bound by
the derelictions of its officials.19 In view of this circumstance, the question, accord-
ing to the court, was whether or not the plaintiffs in this action should be allowed
to recover more than the $21,000 of collected taxes, liability for which was admitted
by the state, and so to throw the entire burden of its bond issue upon the state.
This question the court answered in the negative; apparently justice required that
the burden which the state had assumed and which it had evaded for forty years,
should now be shifted to the plaintiffs. In making clear how the defendant's own
laches could relieve it of liability, the court explained that in this action the state
could not be bound by the omissions of its attorney-generals. Similarly, it was
held that the failure of present counsel for the state to raise the laches argument
in the trial court and so to make it a part of the trial court record, could not
deprive the state of a valid defense.
As an enunciation of law, the court's latches argument approaches the ridiculous;
logically, the laches of a defendant should improve, not impair, a plaintiff's right to
recover. The members of the court were themselves in such disagreement over the
treatment of the whole case that no single majority agreed with the decisions upon
the various issues presented.20 But when a court is so patently devoting its attention
to the attainment of a given result, its decision should be appraised not on the
correctness of its law but upon the justice of that result and the degree of ingenuity
shown in achieving it. Upon this basis, support for the decision in the instant case
is to be found, if at all, in local antagonism toward carpetbag bonds and in the
depression finances of an harassed state treasury.
17. The necessity for this interpretation is open to question. In Woodruff v. State,
supra note 6, at 108, 25 So. at 486, it was stated that: Until they were collected, the
charges and assessments were not a trust fund, but existed only as a tax levied on the land.
. . . Wizen collected, the taxes became a fund which the adt declared should be a trust
fund and pledged to creditors." And the statute provided that the taxes levied "shall be
as they are from time to time collected, and they are hereby constituted a special fund and
trust . . ." Miss. Laws 1871, c. 1, § 10. (Italics added.)
18. An appellate court ordinarily cannot raise the question of laches on its own motion.
Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 166 Cal. 426, 137 Pac. 21 (1913); Cook v. Darnell, 100
Cal. App. 491, 280 Pac. 383 (1929) ; Tanous v. Johnston, 113 Ore. 343, 232 Pac. 793 (1925).
19. The state is not ordinarily bound by the omissions of its agents or officials in the
enforcement of a public right. United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338 (1888) ; Terre Haute
& Indianapolis Rr. Co. v. State, 159 Ind. 438, 65 N. E. 401 (1902); State v. Paul, 113 Kan.
412, 214 Pac. 425 (1923).
20. One judge concurred only in the decision upon one issue, while two other judges
dissented only from that issue. The affirmative votes of these three judges were necessary
in the determination of a majority of the court.
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TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR DEPRECIATION AND DEPLETION ON THE INCOME OF CESTUIS
QuE TRUSTENT
A RECENT comment1 discusses at length the theory, mathematics and proper applica-
tion of the sections of the Revenue Acts providing for depletion allowances. It was
there pointed out that unless an adequate deduction is permitted for depletion, earn-
ings which should be classified as return of capital will be taxed as income-a result
which, if not unconstitutional, 2 is clearly undesirable. The analysis and conclusion
is applicable as well to depreciation allowances, since reserves for depreciation and
depletion, though dealing with different forms of assets, serve the same function and
are otherwise identical. 3 Two recent cases raise the problem of the applicability of
such depletion and depreciation allowances to the interests of cestuis que trustent.
In Helvering v. Falk an iron mine was conveyed to trustees to hold during two lives
and twenty-one years. It was subject to a fourteen year lease, but its life was esti-
mated at only nine years. The trust deed provided that all the proceeds from the
mine which should come into the bands of the trustees were to be distributed to the
beneficiaries. In filing income tax returns, the cestuis sought to deduct from their
gross incomes sums representing proportionate shares of the depletion allowance per-
mitted under the Revenue Acts. 4 These deductions were rejected by the Commis-
sioner, whose decision was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals,5 but reversed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals6 and by the Supreme Court.7
If the settlor in the instant case had chosen to give to the donee beneficiaries each
year an amount measured by the annual yield of the mine, these annual payments
would be classed as gifts and exempted from income taxation.5 If the donor had
given the beneficiaries a lump sum equal to the value of the mine, the donees would
not be subject to an income tax upon the gift, but only upon the income derived
therefrom. When he gave them the whole annual yield of the mine, placing legal
title to it in trustees who were to pass on all the proceeds to the beneficiaries, his
1. (1934) 43 YALE, L. J. 466.
2. See Cooper v. Reynolds, 60 F. (2d) 650, 653 (D. Wyo. 1932). In Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103 (1916), the Court held that a tax which did not take into con-
sideration adequate depletion allowances would be a tax on the "results of the business of
carrying on mining operations," but this would not necessarily apply to individual returns.
There is some discussion of this problem in Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Annuities
and Similar Periodical Payments (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 229.
3. See Brandeis, J., in United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 301 (1927), and Stone, J.,
dissenting in Helvering v. Falk, 54 Sup. Ct. 353, 356 (1934).
4. 42 STAT. 241 (1921), 26 U. S. C. § 955 (9) (1926).
5. Falk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 24 B. T. A. 299 (1931).
6. Falk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 64 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
7. Helvering v. Falk, supra note 3.
8. "The term 'gross income' does not include the following items, which shall be exempt
from taxation under this title [the income tax]: (3) The value of property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent (but the income from such property shall be included
in gross income)." 43 STAT. 267, 263 (1924), 26 U. S. C. § 954 (b) (1926), reenacted with
no material alteration in 47 STAT. 178 (1932), 26 U. S. C. SUPP. VI § 22 (1932). In Bur-
net v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 (1931), an annuity for life to be paid out of residue of
testator's estate was held to be a legacy exempt from income taxes. Since the present note
is concerned solely with the income tax, the application of gift and estate taxes to these
situations is not considered.
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action was tantamount to providing that the cestuis should receive annual gifts of
the corpus of the trust in addition to the income upon the total amount in trust.
The latter is properly subject to an income tax, but the rest of the annual payments
are outright gifts of the principal, and must consequently be exempted from the tax.
Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, argued that the cestuis should not be allowed any
deduction for depletion because they had made no capital investment. However,
the annual amounts yielded by a mine, just as those received from an annuity, are
made up of income (profit or interest on the capital invested in the mine or the
annuity) and principal (the capital itself). 9 And payments of principal are exempted
from taxation under the income tax laws whether they are received by way of return
of capital or as gifts.1° The Court has held that the legal form of the taxpayer's
interest is immaterial in determining income tax liability," and that the existence of a
trust does not affect the right to deduct for depletion.
12
A case decided on the same day involved an estate which had been left in trust
for various beneficiaries, with remainders to their descendants, or, in case of failure
of issue, to Harvard University. For a number of years the trustee distributed the
income without deducting anything for depreciation of the buildings and other assets
of the corpus. In 1928 the California court having jurisdiction of the estate ordered
him to withhold depreciation allowances in the future, and to recover from the
beneficiaries all sums paid in the past which should have been withheld for a deprecia-
tion reserve. This order was carried out by the beneficiaries through delivery of non-
interest-bearing notes to the trustee, payable to the remaindermen upon termination
of the trust. The Commissioner sought to collect income taxes on these overpayments
for all the years in which they had been distributed, although the Revenue Acts re-
quire cestuis to pay taxes only on income that is "distributable."' 13 The Supreme
Court held that the adjudication of the California court was determinative as to what
was distributable income, and refused to charge the cestuis for taxes on the sums
represented by the notes.14 In a persuasive dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo
argued in favor of sustaining the tax on the ground that "substantial benefits" were
9. Cf. Comment, supra note 1, at 467.
10. For the application of the Revenue Acts to income from annuities, see U. S. TRAms.
REG. 77 (1932) arts. 62 and 82; and Fehr, What is an Annuity for Income Tax Purposes?
(1929) 7 NAT. Ix. TAX MAG. 259.
11. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364 (1925); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U. S.
551, 557 (1933).
12. Merle-Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930), cert. den., 282 U. S. 897 (1931).
13. 42 STAT. 246 (1921), 26 U. S. C. § 960 (1926).
14. Freuler v. Helvering, 54 Sup. Ct. 308 (1934). The litigation involving the trust
established by A. C. Whitcomb in his will for the beneficiaries who are the parties in this
suit and for other beneficiaries whose suits are all finally disposed of in their favor by this
decision, appears in Whitcomb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 B. T. A. 80 (1926);
5 B. T. A. 191 (1926); Whitcomb v. Blair, 25 F. (2d) 528 (D. C. App. 1928) (all denying
the deduction for depreciation on the beneficiaries' returns before the California court
had ordered the overpayments returned); Whitcomb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
22 B. T. A. 118 (1931) (permitting the deduction after the decision of the California court) ;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Freuler, 62 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Burnet
v. Whitcomb, 65 F. (2d) 803 (D. C. App. 1933) (both denying the deduction in spite of
the decision of the California court).
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received by the beneficiaries by virtue of their control of money to which they were
not entitled and because of the method of repayment employed. During the period
before maturity of the notes the cestuis may earn for themselves considerably more
income from these sums than would be possible if the trustee were administering
them under the laws applicable to trust investments. Similarly, they may use and
risk loss of all the money, and, when application is made for payment of the notes,
they may resort to a bankruptcy court. Moreover, the remaindermen are all closely
related to the present cestuis, and there inay never be a demand for satisfaction of
the obligations. These benefits are indeed substantial and should not be disregarded;
though, because they may not be entirely equivalent in value to the sums returned,
it would seem unusually severe to treat the whole amount in question as taxable in-
come. Furthermore, the beneficiaries have paid, and will continue to pay, taxes on
the income annually realized from their investment of the money.
But this case might have been decided without resort to a discussion of the effect
of the overpayments and execution of the notes. It is conceivable that a trust deed,
as in the Falk case, might specifically instruct the trustee to distribute all the proceeds
to the beneficiaries without regard for a depreciation reserve.:L The cestuis would,
it is true, receive greater economic benefit than those who are paid only net income
with depreciation allowances deducted. But it must be assumed that the settlor of
such a trust intended that part of the principal should be given outright periodically
to the temporary tenant at the expense of the remaindermen, and that current dis-
tribution should not be limited to income. Under this arrangement the cestuis would
receive the principal of the legacy as well as the income, since both depreciation and
depletion reserves are properly classed as principal. 16 Upon the analysis presented
above, therefore, the cestuis of such a trust should be permitted, in determining their
tax liability, to deduct from the gross amounts distributed to them the portion which
represents principal.' 7 A fortiori, the deduction should be allowed in the instant
case, where, by order of the state court, none of the principal was to be paid out with
income and the cestuis were required to return the erroneously distributed deprecia-
tion reserve.
15. The proceeds of property generally classed as "wasting assets" are often distributed
to the beneficiaries, whether cestuis que trustent, partners, or stockholders, without allow-
ances for depletion, apparently on the theory that the investors intended only to invest in
that piece of property, and, when its value is gone, will want to be able to reinvest their
capital at will.
16. See Palmer v. Bender, supra note 11, at 558.
17. The earlier statutes allowed as a deduction from gross income, for individuals, "a
reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property. . . " 43 STAT. 269, 270
(1924), 26 U. S. C. § 955 (8) (1926). The latest statute adds the following words: "In
the case of property held in trust, the allowable deduction shall be apportioned between
the income beneficiaries and the trustee in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
instrument creating the trust, or, in the absence of such provisions, on the basis of the trust
income allocable to each." 47 STAT. 179, 181 (1932), 26 U. S. C. Supp. VI § 23 (k) (1932).
This change perhaps shows that Congress intended to permit cestuis to make depreciation
deductions, since most cases involving facts similar to those in the instant case have been
decided adversely to the cestuis. Roxburghe v. United States, 64 Ct. CL. 223 (1927), cert.
den., 278 U. S. 598 (1928) ; Hubbell v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) ; Codman
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 763, 766 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); Roxburghe
v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 693 (D. C. App., 1932). See Kaufmann v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 44 F. (2d) 144, 146 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). In Baltzell v. Mitchell, 3 F. (2d) 428
(C. C. A. 1st, 1925), deductions for depreciation due to capital losses from stock sales were
not permitted to the cestui.
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RIGHT OF LIFE TENANT TO PROFITS OF BUSINESS DURING AUTHORIZED
POSTPONEMENT OF SALE BY EXECUTOR
ORDNiNARy, pecuniary legacies or interest thereon, when no time of payment is fixed,
become payable one year from the testator's death.1 Where, however, there is a
devise of the interest or income, either of a whole or of a part of the residue of an
estate, to one person for life, with remainder over, the life tenant is entitled to
interest from the date of the testator's death, in the absence of a contrary provision
in the will.2 When such residue consists wholly or partly of property other than
money, and the testator fails to specify the form in which it is to be enjoyed by
the life tenant, the rule of Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth3 requires that the property
be immediately converted into securities authorized by statute for the investment
of trust funds.4 If the executor fails to make the conversion promptly, the life
tenant is entitled only to an equitable income based on the property's estimated
value at the time of the testator's death, and not to the actual income the executor
has received.
A novel situation arises where the testator, leaving residuary property to a life
tenant, directs the executor to delay sale for a specified time following his death,
and fails to state what the life tenant shall receive during the intervening period.
In a recent case6 the testator provided for the creation of a trust out of the residue
of his estate, one-third of the income to be paid to his widow for life with remainder
over to his lawful issue upon her death. The residue included an extensive shoe
business, which the executor was directed to operate for such time as he should deem
most advantageous to the benefit of the estate, but in no case beyond two years
after the testator's death, when it should be sold. During its operation by the
executor, but prior to the establishment of the trust, the business profited to an
1. See, e.g., N. Y. SURROGATE'S CouRT Acr (1920, amended 1928) § 218; Redfield v.
Marvin, 78 Conn. 704, 707, 63 Atl. 120, 121 (1906).
2. Green v. Green, 30 N. J. Eq. 451, 456 (1879); Corle v. Monkhouse, 47 N. J. Eq. 73,
77, 20 Atl. 367, 368 (1890).
3. 7 Ves. 137 (1802).
4. The testator may avoid the result of Howe v. Dartmouth by providing that the
property is to be enjoyed in specie, In re Beaufoy's Estate, 1 Sm. & G. 20 (1852), or by
stating that the entire or actual income is to be paid to the life tenant. In re Chancellor,
26 Ch. D. 42 (1884); In re Crowther, [1895] 2 Ch. 56. It should be observed that the
rule applies only in the case of residuary property, as distinguished from specific bequests.
In re Van Straubenzee, [19011 2 Ch. 779, 782.
5. In England this rule has recently been altered, in the matter of real estate, by
Section 28 of the Law of Property Act, 15 Gao. V, c. 20, § 28 (2) (1925), providing that
"subject to any direction to the contrary [by the testator] . . . the net rents and profits
of the land until sale shall be paid . . . [to the persons entitled to the income after
conversion] ." In re Brooker's Trusts, 1926 W. N. 93. However, the rule still applies to
property other than leaseholds. In re Trollope's Will Trusts, [1927] 1 Ch. 596. In this
country it is generally held that if a testator leaves unproductive real estate or personalty
to be converted for the benefit of a life tenant, and there is a delay before sale is possible,
the life tenant is entitled out of the proceeds of the sale to the amount of income he
would have received had the conversion been made immediately upon the death of the
testator. Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658 (1903); Comment (1930) 40
YALE L. 3. 275.
6. Gaede v. Carroll, 169 Atl. 172 (N. J. Eq. 1933).
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extent of $800,000. The widow contended that she was entitled to one-third of the
actual income earned during the interval following her husband's death, while the
executor claimed that the $800,000 belonged to the corpus for the benefit of remain-
dermen. The court, relying principally on Howe v. Dartmouth, held that the widow
should receive no share of the profits but only the accrued equitable interest based
on an estimated value of the business at the time of the testator's death.
There is an important distinguishing feature between Howe v. Dartmouth and
the present case. In the former the testator made no provision as to whether the
personal estate should immediately be converted into investment securities or whether
it should be enjoyed by the life tenant in specie. The purpose of the rule adopted
was to provide for an equitable division of profits between life tenant and remain-
derman, 7 where the testator failed to indicate his intention and it was entirely
uncertain what he desired. In the present case, however, it is clear that the testator
intended no immediate conversion, since the executor was specifically directed to carry
on the business for two years, or at least until a favorable opportunity for sale should
present itself. Thus far the courts, faced with such a provision for postponement
of sale, have apparently failed to utilize Howe v. Dartmouth in determining the
rights of the life tenant. The most frequently recurring example of profits in the
testator's business accruing after his death appears in the case of partnerships whose
articles provide for their continuation during a stated period following the death
of any partner. Where such a partner devises the residue of his estate, including
his interest in the partnership, to a life tenant, the latter is ordinarily awarded the
actual profits earned after the testator's death unless the will has provided otherwise.8
But if it appears to be the testator's intent that the actual profits of the business are
to go to the general fund, rather than to the life tenant, the court will undoubtedly
so decree.9 In the present case the general direction to the executor to invest the
residuary funds in bonds, mortgages or authorized securities, together with "other
provisions of the will" not set forth in the opinion, were considered by the court to
indicate an intention that the profits of the shoe business pending conversion were
to be applied to the trust res. On the other hand, it might equally well be argued
that the testator's direction to postpone conversion showed an intention that those
profits should go to the life tenant. In any event, if there is serious doubt as to
his intention, it would seem, for purposes of simplifying administration and in view
of the testator's normally closer relationship with the life tenant than with the
remainderman, that the life tenant should not be restricted to an equitable income,
but should be awarded the actual profits earned during the authorized postponement
of conversion.
7. As stated by Lord Eldon: "As in the one case that, in which the Tenant for life
has too great an interest, is melted for the benefit of the rest, in the other that, of which,
if it remained in specie, he might never receive any thing, is brought in; and he has imme-
diately the interest of its present worth." Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, supra note 3, at 148.
8. Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437, 27 N. E. 65 (1891); Heighe v. Littig, 63 Md.
301 (1885); In re Weaver's Estate, 53 Misc. 244, 104 N. Y. Supp. 475 (Surr. Ct. 1907);
cf. It re Rogers, 37 Misc. 54, 74 N. Y. Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1902) (no provision for
continuation, but executors permitted the surviving partner to carry on the business for
two years). Contra: Mudge v. Parker, 139 Mass. 153, 29 N. E. 543 (1885); In re Prince's
Will, 141 Misc. 600, 252 N. Y. Supp. 908 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Fearns v. Young, 9 Ves. 549
(1S04).
9. Willard's Ex'r v. Willard, 21 AtI. 463 (N. J. Ch. 1891).
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NECESSITY OF HEARING To DETERMINE NEED FOR ELIMINATION OF GRADE CROSSING
THE Highway Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Virginia, acting pursuant to a
statute' which empowered him to order the elimination by a railroad of any grade
crossing on a state road when in his opinion public safety and convenience so re-
quired, ordered the Southern Railway Company to build an overhead structure at a
certain point on its right of way, and furnished it with plans for the proposed struc-
ture. The statute afforded the railroad no right to notice or hearing prior to the
commissioner's order. But it did provide for an administrative review should the
railroad be dissatisfied with the plans and specifications; in that event the Cor-
poration Commission was empowered to consider the proposed plans and approve or
modify them. Costs were to be divided between the state and the railroad. The
company refused to undertake the work and demurred to an order of the Corpora-
tion Commission requiring it to proceed. The Supreme Court of the United States,
reversing the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,2 held the statute unconstitutional
on the ground that it empowered an executive officer, without notice to the railroad
or opportunity to be heard, to make a final determination of fact and on the basis
of that determination to take private property for a public use.3
It has long been established that a state may, in the exercise of its police power,
provide for the elimination of grade crossings at the expense of a railroad. In ac-
cepting a charter the railroad agrees to the imposition of these charges, and such
taking of property as may result does not violate the guaranties of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 The discretionary power of determining what crossings shall be elim-
inated may be exercised by the legislature itself without notice or hearingG or dele-
gated to the governing body of a municipality, which may also without prior notice
or hearing require the construction of a viaduct at the expense of the railroad.0 Stat-
utes vesting discretion in administrative bodies to order the removal of "dangerous"
crossings have, it is true, usually provided for notice to the railroad and opportunity
to be heard,7 but there would seem to be little difference between delegation of ex
1. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 3974a.
2. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 779, 167 S. E. 578 (1933).
3. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 54 Sup. Ct. 148 (1933), Hughes, C. J., and
Cardozo and Stone, 3. J., dissenting.
4. New York and New England Rr. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (1894). It may
also be argued that there is here no taking of property within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment [cf. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners,
200 U. S. 561, 583 (1906)] since the structure replacing the grade crossing is a valuable
asset of the company, reducing the possibility of liability for crossing accidents. See also
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583, 594 (1908).
5. Cf. New York and New England Rr. Co. v. Bristol, supra note 4, upholding a
statute which ordered the removal by railroads of one grade crossing a year for every
sixty miles of road operated in the state. See also N. J. Com! . STAT. (Supp. 1924)
§ 167-29.
6. St. Louis v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 262 Mo. 720, 174 S. W. 73 (1914); cf.
'Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57 (1898); Northern Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Duluth, supra note 4; Birmingham v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 213 Ala.
92, 104 So. 258 (1925); see Kansas v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 33 Kan. 176, 189, 5 Pac
772, 780 (1885).
7. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3670; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1926) § 12841; N. J.
Cozxp. STAT. (Supp. 1924) §§ 167-30 to 167-36, upheld in Erie Rr. Co. v. Board of Public
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parte powers in such matters to a city council and delegation thereof to a commission
or to a single commissioner as provided by the Virginia statute; unless the distinction
be that a city council, as opposed to a commission, is a legislative tribunal whose
determinations are presumed to be valid without a finding of fact.8 But this distinc-
tion, illusory in any case, vanishes if the statute in question merely fails to provide
for a hearing and finding of fact upon questions which cannot reasonably be disputed.
Hearings are without doubt of value, where the elimination of grade crossings is
concerned, for the determination of controversial matters such as the type of struc-
ture most suitable to replace a particular crossing, the plans and specifications and
the division of costs. But the statute in the principal case is not deficient in these
respects. It only fails to provide a hearing on the question of the necessity for the
elimination of the crossing at grade. And the usefulness of such hearings is open to
serious question. For although the courts, in searching for definitive standards by
which to rationalize their control of administrative bodies, have been able to set
up certain criteria for the guidance of commissions in measuring the necessity and ex-
pediency of the removal of grade crossings,' 0 these criteria are in practice of little
importance. Few if any crossings fail to conform to the required standard of danger
and inconvenience. 1'
The Court quotes at length from two rate cases 1- where it was said that a finding
without evidence by an administrative commission is per se arbitrary and baseless,
and concludes that a hearing is equally essential in the principal case. But in the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "the power of the State over grade crossings derives
little light from cases on the power to regulate trains."' 3 Arbitrary action need
not be feared. If it is not prevented by the self-interest of the state, which in
the instant case must pay for half of that part of the structure extending beyond
Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394 (1921); N. Y. RAoLROAD LAW (McKinney, 1918)
§§ 91, 95; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 67, § 392, construed in Delaware & Hudson Co.
v. Public Service Commission, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 169 (1929); VT. PUn. LAWS (Proposed
Revision, 1933) § 6026.
8. St. Louis v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 6; see Durham v. Southern Ry. Co.,
185 N. C. 240, 244, 117 S. E. 17, 19 (1923), aff'd, 266 U. S. 178 (1924).
9. Note 1, supra.
10. See Erie Rr. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 89 N. J. L. 57, 68,
98 AtI. 13, 18, (1916), aff'd, 254 U. S. 394 (1921); Commerce Commission v. Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 309 Ill. 165, 171, 140 N. E. 868, 870 (1923);
rn re Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. Co., 220 App. Div. 80, 221 N. Y. Supp. 129 (2d
Dep't 1927) passim, aff'd, 245 N. Y. 643 (1927).
11. Perhaps at some crossings unfrequented either by trains or automobiles, protection
by watchmen would not impede traffic and the expenditure of large sums on a viaduct
might not be in the public interest. Cf. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, supra note 7. But "extraordinar' care . . .aided by all the advances in science
and mechanics, has only resulted in lessening the risk, not in abolishing it." Scranton &
Pittston Traction Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 180 Pa. 636, 640, 37 Ati. 122,
124 (1897), modified, 181 Pa. 582, 37 AtI. 1118 (1897). The improbability of purely
arbitrary action under the Virginia statute is discussed infra.
12. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co., 227 U. S.
88, 91 (1913), and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.- S.
418, 457, 458 (1890).
13. Erie Rr. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, supra note 7, at 410.
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the railroad's right of way,14 it can always be curbed by "equity's long arm."
10 The
only effect of the decision, therefore, is to require time-consuming formalities in the
determination of facts which are in their nature self-evident.16
IMPAIRMENT oF PRIVATE RIGHTS BY INTERSTATE COMPACT
ALTHOUGH the Constitution provides that "No state shall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation,"' an implied sanction of certain forms of interstate agree-
ments is found in the further provision that "No state shall, without the consent of
Congress .. .enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a
foreign power."'2 The typical use of such compacts has been in the adjustment of
regional problems involving more than one state but still not national in scope.
Boundary disputes, the allocation of water rights in irrigation projects, questions of
conservation of natural resources, harbor problems, and matters of state criminal
jurisdiction have all been settled by this means.3 It has also been suggested as a
possible method of strengthening state control over interstate transmission of elec-
tricity and of expanding the jurisdiction of the states over public utility holding com-
panies.4 But the potentialities of interstate agreements will depend upon whether or
14. Note 1, supra.
15. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 794, 167 S. E. at 582;
Lehigh Valley Rr. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, 40 (1928);
Allen v. Distilling Co. of America, 87 N. 3. Eq. 531, 543, 100 Atl. 620, 624 (1917).
16. The dissenting Justices thought the statute valid upon the similar theory that
the power delegated was one to abate a nuisance, and therefore exercisable without notice
or hearing. Supra note 3, at 151; cf. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 155 Mass. 281, 29 N. E.
522 (1892); Health Department v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833 (1895).
1. U. S. Coxsr., art. 1, § 10.
2. Ibid. These provisions have been interpreted to require congressional consent only
in cases affecting the increase or diminution of the political power of a state. COOLEY, CON-
sTiT oToNAL LAw (4th ed. 1931) 130; 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CoNsTTUTOrAL LAw OF Tm
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 172; Bruce, Compacts and Agreements of States (1918) 2
MIN. L. Rxv. 500; see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 518, 519 (1893); Union
Branch Rr. Co. v. East Tennessee & Georgia Rr. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 338, 339, 340 (1853); cf.
Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155 (1894); Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200 (1845).
But cf. Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. 3. 635. Even where the consent of Congress is ad-
mittedly necessary, such consent may be implied from subsequent conduct of Congress
sanctioning the objects of the agreement or aiding in their enforcement. Green v. Biddle, 21
U. S. 1 (1823); Virginia v. Tennessee, supra; 2 STORY, CoMMNTraIEs ON THE CONsT'rnTOzs
or TH UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891) § 1405; ci. Wharton v. Wise, supra.
3. Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause oi the Constitution-A Study in Inter-
state Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685, 696, 735; Carpenter, Reserve Treaty Powers
oi the States (1921) CoLoaDO BAR AssocliTIoN REP. 45, 76; WAmuR, THE SUPREmE COURT
AND SoVEREIGN STATES (1924) 121. Various kinds of interstate compacts have been con-
sidered in Green v. Biddle, supra note 2; Marlatt v. Silk, 36 U. S. 1 (1837); Wharton v.
Wise, supra note 2; Central Rr. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U. S. 473 (1908); Virginia v. West
Virginia, 220 U. S. 1 (1911); Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U. S. 260 (1922); Kansas City v.
Fairfax Drainage District, 34 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929), cert. den., 281 U. S. 722
(1930); Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1 (Md.
1832); Couch v. State, 140 Tenn. 156, 203 S. W. 831 (1918).
4. Cf. Crawford, Control of Interstate Transmission of Electricity (1929) 5 J. L.D AND
not they are susceptible to attack under a state or federal due process clause where
they interfere with private rights previously established by law.
A recent case raises the issue. Colorado and New Mexico entered into a compact5
whereby the waters of a river flowing through both states were to be "rotated" to
meet as nearly as possible the rights of appropriators in each. The execution of the
compact necessitated interference with a Colorado company's use of water to which
it had previously acquired priority by court decree. A mandatory injunction was
sought to protect this right. The appropriation system as opposed to the riparian is
in force in Colorado, and rights to the use of water are accordingly based not upon
the reasonable needs of each riparian owner but upon priority of appropriation. 6 The
state constitution, moreover, dedicates the water of every natural stream to the use
of the public subject to appropriation and declares that the power to appropriate un-
claimed waters of a stream shall never be denied. 7 Under state statutes passed
pursuant to these provisions the plaintiff held its decreed priority, part of which it
would necessarily lose if the compact were enforced. And Colorado has held that such
a decreed priority is not only a property right but a freehold.8 The plaintiff's water
rights, therefore, were not like franchises granted by the state and subject to revoca-
tion at the pleasure of the legislature.9 They were more nearly analogous to a grant
of title to real property of which it could not be deprived without due process of
law. The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled that under the state due process clause,
the terms of which are the same as the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff's decreed
priority could not be infringed by interstate compact, and granted the injunction
prayed.' 0
The Constitution does not provide that rights once established by law shall be un-
alterable. If the dispute between Colorado and New Mexico had originally been
PUB. UTn. EcoN. 229; Bigham, Regulation of Interstate Transmission (1929) 5 id. 385;
Crawford and Mosher, Federal Control of Interstate Utilities (1932) 9 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 80;
(1925) FEDERAL POWER CoAI.ssIon REP. 10; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 3. How-
ever, most of these commentators conclude that the use of the compact device is in this
connection impracticable.
5. The consent of Congress was secured. 43 STAT. 796 (1925).
6. CoLo. CoNsT., art. 16, § 6; Hammond v. Rose, 11 Colo. 524, 19 Pac. 466 (1888) ; Wiel,
Priority in Western Wrater Law (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 189; 1 NVEL, WATER RIGHTS (3d ed.
1911) § 299.
7. CoLo. CONST., art. 16, §§ 5, 6.
8. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Childs, 25 Colo. 360, 54 Pac. 1020 (1898); Monte Vista
Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 364, 123 Pac. 831 (1912); cf.
Idaho Irrigation Co. v. Gooding, 265 U. S. 518 (1924); Strickler v. City of Colorado
Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 Pac. 313 (1891); Hilt v. Weber 252 Mich. 198, 233 N. W. 159
(1930); Skinner v. Jordan Valley Irrigation District, 137 Ore. 480, 300 Pac. 499 (1931),
3 P. (2d) 534 (1931).
9. Cf. Smith, Judicial Interpretation of Public Utility Franchises (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
957.
10. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 25 P. (2d) 187 (Colo.
1933), noted in (1934) 34 COLO. L. REv. 169. Appeal has been taken to the United States
Supreme Court. Docket No. 588. An interesting question of jurisdiction is involved, since
the state court rested its determination upon the Colorado Constitution. Will the fact of
congressional approval of the compact enable the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction never-
theless? The Court has postponed consideration of the jurisdictional issue to the hearing
on the merits. U. S. Law Week, Dec. 19, 1933, at 13.
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brought before the United States Supreme Court it is conceivable that the same
result would have been reached judicially as was attained by compact." And in that
event, after a full hearing upon the matter, private parties could not have enjoined
enforcement of the decree. Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
different effect be accorded a settlement reached by interstate agreement. Due process
is not an exclusive prerogative of the courts. Indeed, the recognized purpose of the
interstate compact, approved by students of the subject12 and by the Supreme
Court' 3 is to deal with problems which the courts are in a poor position to handle.
The lengthy proceedings necessary adequately to present the facts in cases like the
present, the unfamiliarity of the judges with the technical aspects of the question and
the likelihood of prolonged litigation before final solution of the multifarious dif-
ficulties can be achieved, argue effectively for the compact method of adjustment as
a substitute for judicial process. And the Supreme Court has held in suits involving
problems analogous to the instant case that where one state has granted title to land,
a subsequent compact determining that such land belongs to another state and in-
validating titles granted by the first state is not an unlawful alteration of private
rights, since no state has power to give title to property without its jurisdiction.
14
The same argument is equally applicable to disputed water rights. If, therefore, as
was not denied, Colorado's citizens were adequately represented in the negotiations
resulting in the compact here in question and their rights accorded due considera-
tion,15 the constitutional condition precedent to deprivation of property would seem
clearly to have been satisfied. 16
11. Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 (1902); 206 U. S. 46 (1907); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 496 (1922) ; 260 U. S. 1 (1922) ; 286 U. S. 494 (1932) ; Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336
(1931); Bannister, Interstate Rights in Interstate Streams in the Arid West (1923) 36
HAv. L. REv. 960.
12. Cf. Johnson, Uniform Laws by Interstate Compact (1908) OHro STATE BAR AssocIA-
TiON REP. 174; WIGMORE, PROBLEMS oF LAW (1920) 126-135; Chamberlain, Current Legis-
lation (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 207; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 3; Donovan, State
Compacts as a Method of Settling Problems Common to Several States (1931) 80 U. or PA.
L. REv. 5; Note (1922) 35 HAav. L. R~v. 322. But cf. Rogers, Some Problems of the Inter-
state Water War (1923) Coto. BAR AssocivxTio REP. 107.
13. See Washington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 205, 218 (1909); Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252
U. S. 273, 283 (1920) ; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 313 (1921).
14. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U. S. 185 (1837); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 1 (1887); cf.
Marlatt v. Silk, supra note 3; 2 W=EI., op. cit. supra note 6, § 1230, n. 14.
15. A convincing dissent declares: "If notice and a hearing were necessary to the validity
of the compact-and they were not-the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that there
was no notice or hearing. No such proof or offer of such proof was made." Supra note
10, at 192. Cf. McSween v. Live Stock Sanitary Board of Florida, 97 Fla. 750, 775, 122 So.
239, 248 (1929), as to the necessity of notice for a legislative act.
16. As a result of the court's decision there arises the possibility of a suit by New Mexico
to enforce its rights under the compact. Cf. Green v. Biddle, supra note 2; 1 Cooarm, CoN-
sTITUTIONAL LnI=IATIONs (8th ed. 1927) 21; 3 WHLouGmHY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 875
et seq.; Waaxn, op. cit. supra note 3, at 69 et seq. Interstate compacts have been held to
be enforceable contracts. Green v. Biddle, supra note 2; cf. Fisher v. Cockerell, 30 U. S. 247
(1831); Hawkins v. Barney, 30 U. S. 456 (1831); Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U. S. 39
(1870); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140 (1911).
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USE OF BONDHOLDERS' COMMITTEE TO AGGREGATE CLAIMS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION
THE requirement that suits brought in the federal District Courts must involve at
least $3,0001 cannot be satisfied by aggregating several smaller claims unless a bona
fide transfer of the claims is made to a single individual.2 And a bona fide transfer
is one where there is an actual, not a nominal, transferee.3 An agency relationship,4
for example, or a transfer for collection only 5 is not such an assignment; considera-
tion must pass from the assignee to the original holders, and a promise to pay over
all or part of the proceeds resulting from collection of the claims is not considered
adequate for this purpose.0 Accordingly in suits by taxpayers to enjoin the collec-
tion of taxes federal jurisdiction is determined by the amount of interest of each
complainant and not by the total of the claims. 7 Similarly a creditor's bill must
usually involve $3,000 without aggregation with others,8 and a stockholder's bill must
ordinarily meet the jurisdictional amount as to each stockholder's claim.9 These rules
have been strictly observed; exception has been made only where the suit is to
enforce a single title in which the claimants have a common and undivided interest.1 0
Thus when a creditor sues on behalf of creditors similarly situated to enforce an
assignment for the benefit of creditors or for the appointment of a receiver to
1. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1926).
2. Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209 (1381); Bernards Township v. Stebbins, 109 U.
S. 341 (1883).
3. Lake County Commissioners v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 243 (1899).
4. Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U. S. 117 (1910); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Erie
Rr. Co., 172 Fed. 899 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909).
5. Waite v. Santa Cruz, 134 U. S. 302 (1902).
6. Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138 (1885); Central Paper Co. v. Southwick, 56
F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
7. Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U. S. 292 (1924); Elliott v. Board of Trustees,
53 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Crawford County Trust and Savings Bank v. Craw-
ford, 63 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933), where plaintiffs as stockholders in a bank con-
tested a tax on stock and an aggregation of their claims was denied. Cf. First National
Bank of Woodbine v. Harrison County, 57 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), where the
bank joined as party plaintiff in a similar action and because of a statute making the bank
secondarily liable for such taxes jurisdiction was upheld.
8. Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. School
District No. 1, 63 F. (2d) 878 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
9. Woods v. Thompson, 14 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Haas v. Burton, 25 F.
(2d) 938 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928); Ayer v. Kemper, 48 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). Cf.
Cohn v. Cities Service Co., 45 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); General Finance Corpora-
tion v. Keystone Credit Corporation, 50 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
10. 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 "U. S. C. 80 (1926). See BuNNS, JURIsDIcTION AND PPACTIcE
Or THE COURTS Or TnE UmTED STATES (3d ed. 1927) 44-46. The matter in controversy has
been considered a common, undivided claim in the following cases: Kline v. Wright, 42 F.
(2d) 927 (E. D. Idaho, 1930) (suit to adjudicate mining rights); Harvey v. American Coal
Co., 50 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) (suit by several plaintiffs to restrain the use of
a trade name); Dern v. Tanner, 60 F. (2d) 626 (D. Mont. 1932) (suit to adjudicate water
priorities); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Jones, 2 F. Supp. 600 (N. D. N. C. 1933) (suit
to cancel two life insurance policies contracted for by the same parties). Cf. Essman v.
Hood, 45 F. (2d) 881 (N. D. Tex. 1930); Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 49 F. (2d) 66
(C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
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marshall the debtor's assets," or when a stockholder brings suit against the corporate
management for breach of trust,12 the jurisdiction of the court will not depend upon
the amount of the plaintiff's individual interest. But in such case the question is not
one of aggregation of separate claims; the measure of the jurisdictional requirement
is the amount of the assets against which the suit is brought or the value of the
object sought to be gained.
In a recent decision, however, the Supreme Court allowed a bondholders' com-
mittee to sue in the federal courts although the individual claims of all but three
of the prior holders were insufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of
$3,000.13 The relationship between bondholders and a bondholders' protective com-
mittee is usually considered to be one of trust,14 but the terms agency, bailment,
assignment and power of attorney coupled with an interest have all been applied by
the courts. 15 Under the protective agreement the committee takes legal but not
beneficial tile for the purpose of representing the bondholders. It would seem that
the requirement of an actual, bona fide transfer could not thus be satisfied. The
only consideration passing to the bondholders is a promise to pay over the proceeds,
a promise which has heretofore been deemed inadequate. Nor is the suit against a
fund wherein the plaintiffs have "a common and undivided interest"; the case is
clearly one of aggregation of claims. Nevertheless the Court declared that because
the principal aim of a bondholders' committee is not simply to resort to litigation
but, primarily, to invest the trustees with full title and discretionary powers in order
that they may conserve, salvage and adjust the investment, 16 the transfer to a pro-
tective committee should be distinguished from a mere transfer for collection and
the prerequisite of federal jurisdiction regarded as satisfied.
The decision indicates, perhaps, a desire on the part of the Court to relax the
strictness of the previous rule. Or it may be that the merits of the particular case
were persuasive. In either event the decision affords bondholders whose individual
claims would not be sufficient to permit suit in the federal courts a convenient means
of circumventing the restriction. And since the rules as to diversity of citizenship
are the same as those governing the requirement of jurisdictional amount,17 the
11. Putnam v. Timothy Dry Goods Co., 79 Fed. 454 (C. C. Tenn. 1897); Kelly v.
Alabama-Quenelda Graphite Co., 34 F. (2d) 790 (N. D. Ala. 1929).
12. Brown v. Duffin, 13 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Haynes v. Fraternal Aid
Union, 34 F. (2d) 305 (D. Kan. 1929); Johnson v. Ingersoll, 63 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 7th,
1933).
13. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 54 Sup. Ct. 177 (1933), rev'g 62 F. (2d) 313 (C. C. A
5th, 1932). Previously a dismissal by the District Court of a bill for the appointment of a
receiver for the city had been upheld since the statute allowing such a receivership had
been repealed. 48 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). For the advantages of resorting to
federal courts in enforcing municipal bonds, see Comment (1933) 27 ILL. L. Rsv. 432.
14. Fuller v. Venable, 118 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902); Habirshaw Electric Cable Co.
v. Habirshaw Electric Co., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Parker v. New England Oil
Corporation, 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 19 F. (2d) 903 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1927).
15. See Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. REv. 670, 682.
16. 19 FLETCHER, CORPorATioNs (Rev. ed. 1933) § 9318.
17. Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327 (1895); Rojas-Adam
Corporation v. Young, 13 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Board of Education of Town
of Carmen v. James, 49 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931) ; Hollingsworth v. Multa Trina
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device should be equally available to bondholders who could not themselves secure
federal jurisdiction because they are citizens of the corporation's domiciliary state.
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES nY PERSON CONVICTED THROUGH ILLEGAL SEARCH
IN a recent English case,' an official of a radical labor movement was arrested at
the headquarters of the organization, which the police subjected to a thorough search,
and from which they removed all the records, documents and papers which could be
found. Most of these were on examination soon returned, but some were used as
evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings, not against the person arrested at the
time of the seizure but against another leader of the movement, who was ultimately
convicted of incitement to sedition. He and other officials of the organization brought
an action for damages against the police for the seizure and detention of the docu-
ments. The defendants asserted the legality of their conduct, claiming the search
was properly "incidental to an arrest." The court awarded damages for the unlawful
action of the police in removing the books and documents which were of no evidentiary
value at the trial of the accused, but denied damages for the removal of those which
were used at the trial, on the ground that the interest of the State in the preservation
of evidence justified a seizure otherwise unlawful.
The demands of efficient criminal law administration have led to the retention of
the common-law rule which permits an officer making a lawful arrest to search the
person of the accused 2 and the immediate premises,3 and to seize the instruments and
evidences of the crime.4 The search is considered lawful even if the articles seized
are used to prove that the arrested person committed a crime other than the one for
which he was taken in custody.5 But limitations, designed to curb the indiscreet zeal
of police officers, have been imposed upon the so-called "incidental" right of search.
Thus the officers, having once left the premises at which the arrest is made, may not
return to make a further search; 6 nor may they conduct a search elsewhere than at
the place of arrest.7 And where the arrest is made an occasion for a general explora-
tory search for evidences of law violations, the search is declared illegal.8 To preserve
Ditch Co., 51 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931). If an assignor is unable to sue in his own
name on a promissory note or other chose in action payable to bearer and not made by a
corporation his assignee is not allowed to sue on the ground of diversity of citizenship even
though a bona fide transfer has been made. 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1926).
1. Elias v. Pasmore, 50 T. L. R. 196 (K. B. 1934).
2. United States v. Kraus, 270 Fed. 578, 582 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); State v. Hord, 329 Ill.
117, 160 N. E. 135 (1928); Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 129 (1929).
3. Shelton v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
4. Estabrook v. United States, 28 F. (2d) 150, 153 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Argetakis v.
State, 24 Ariz. 599, 603, 212 Pac. 372, 375 (1923); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 224 Ky.
117, 5 S. W. (2d) 887 (1928); People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923).
5. United States v. Murphy, 264 Fed. 842, 245 (E. D. N. Y. 1920); Haverstick v.
State, 196 Ind. 145, 150, 147 N. E. 625, 627 (1925); see Goulded v. United Stats, 255 U. S.
298, 312 (1921). Contra: United States v. Boyd, 1 F. (2d) 1019 (W. D. Wash. 1924).
6. See Comment (1926) 35 YArLz L. J. 612.
7. Ibid.; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
8. United States v. 1013 Crates of Whiskey Bottles, 52 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
Wholesale searches have been declared iligal particularly where papers and documnts
hzve been seized. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931); United
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the individual's constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
offending officer is made liable in damages to the injured person,9 and, in the federal
courts and in approximately half the state courts in which the question has been
considered, the evidence unlawfully obtained may be excluded in subsequent criminal
proceedings. 10 In the remaining state courts, however, such evidence 'is admitted
despite its illegal source, and the injured individual is confined to a civil action for
the recovery of damages." But past experience casts doubt upon the efficacy of a
suit for damages to assure redress to the individual, or to discourage unlawful searches
in the future. Courts and juries are not disposed to render substantial verdicts in
favor of even subsequently acquitted parties12 unless personal injuries have been
sustained or property has been destroyed;' 3 and few victims will incur the expense
of a lawsuit to recover merely nominal damages for injury to the feelings or violation
of the right of privacy.' 4 Moreover, where evidence illegally secured at the arrest
of the person named in the warrant is used against a third party, it is unlikely that
the latter would be allowed even nominal damages, on the ground that since he
possessed no interest in the articles seized his constitutional rights were not invaded. 15
In the principal case, since the plaintiff occupied the premises which were subjected
to the search and possessed an interest in the articles seized, the court should have
awarded damages for the removal of the documents used at the trial as well as those
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932) ; United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. (2d) 202
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926). Seizures have been declared lawful, however, where the papers are
used to carry on the crime and may be seen without a search. Dillon v. O'Brien and Davis,
20 L. R. Ir. 300 (Ex. Div. 1887); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927); United
States v. Poller, 43 F. (2d) 911 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); State v. Mausert, 88 N. J. L. 286,
95 Atl. 991 (1915). Cases which sustain a general search for documents and papers, Sayers
v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924); Smith v. Jerome, 47 Misc. 22, 93
N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1905) constitute an unfortunate minority, or are clearly dis-
tinguishable on their unique facts. United States v. Brunett, 53 F. (2d) 219, 225, 226 (W.
D. Mo. 1931).
9. CoRNFLrs, SnuRcH Am SnrzuRE (2d ed. 1930) §§ 480, 482, 486.
10. Id. § 7 et seq; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). The so-called federal
rule of inadmissibility is approved in CHAFFEE, FsrEDO OF SPEECn (1920) 299 et seq.;
Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rav. 361, 372; Atkinson,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25
COL. L. REv. II.
11. People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). The so-called non-federal
rule of admissibility is approved in 4 XVImORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2184; Harno,
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925) 19 lit. L. Ray. 303.
12. And there is even less likelihood that those who are convicted on the basis of
evidence illegally obtained will be awarded damages for the illegal action of police officials.
Cf. Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Miss. 288, 84 So. 227 (1920), where the jury refused to follow
the trial judge's peremptory instructions to render a verdict for the plaintiff in view of
her bad reputation.
13. See, e.g., American Guaranty Co. v. McNiece, 111 Ohio St. 532, 146 N. E. 77
(1924); Boyd v. Genitempo, 260 S. W. 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
14. See, e. g., Caffinni v. Herman, 112 Me. 282, 91 Atl. 1009 (1914), and Regan v.
Harkey, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 16, 87 S. W. 1164 (1905), in each of which a verdict for $200
was rendered.
15. See CoNELrus, op. cit. supra note 9, § 14.
found to be of no evidentiary value. 16 A denial of liability for a seizure otherwise
unlawful merely because the evidence thus obtained is used in a subsequent prose-
cution amounts to an open sanction for the acquisition of evidence by illegal searches.
The practical result of this decision is to empower the police, in dealing with an
unpopular organization, to conduct a wholesale search of its headquarters in connection
with the arrest of a single member and, with the documentary evidence thus obtained,
to convict the leaders at the cost of a few pounds' damage. And since a prospective
liability for damages has no in terrorem effect upon overzealous police officials, the
result of the instant case would follow in this country, despite constitutional safe-
guards, in those jurisdictions which admit evidence procured through an illegal search
and seizure. It would seem, therefore, that the only effective guaranty against similar
police activity in the future is to exclude the evidence.' 7 The rule of inadmissibility
of illegally obtained evidence, applied in favor of individuals arrested at the time of
the search, should, in view of the policy behind the rule, be extended to situations
where, as in the instant case, the conviction of a third person is sought on the basis
of such evidence.
CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CRaIMINAL TRrALS
Two decisions of the Supreme Court at the present term have made important
changes in the federal law as to the capacity of witnesses and the admissibility of
testimony in criminal trials. Prior to these decisions the general rule was that in
criminal actions the federal courts must adopt the laws of evidence which were in
force in their respective states in 1789 or, if the state was not then a member of the
Union, the law in force at the time of its admission.1 The rule, it is true, had not
been consistently followed with regard to the capacity as witnesses of those previously
convicted of crime.2 But the disability of one spouse as a witness for or against
the other, a rule which has long been abolished by statute in England 3 and in most
states, 4 had been uniformly preserved as it existed at, the time of admission of the
16. In the instant case, of course, the English rule awarding attorneys' fees as an element
of costs partially takes the place of a larger award of damages.
17. See note 10, supra. But see Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search
and Seizure (1928) 13 MN. L. REv. 1, 9.
1. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1892); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438 (1928).
2. Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325 (1892); Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467
(1918). For a discussion of the difficulties involved in attempting a reconciliation of these
cases vAth those cited in note 1, supra, see Leach, State Laws of Evidence in the Federal
Courts (1930) 43 Huv. L. REv. 554. Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in
Federal Courts (1932) 27 IL. L. Rzv. 394 contains a tabulation of the cases in the lower
federal courts which illustrates the cdnfusion caused by the conflicting holdings of the
Supreme Court.
3. The disability was removed as to both spouses by 61 & 62 Vicr. c. 36, § 1 (1898).
The disability had been removed in civil cases by 32 & 33 VicT. c. 68, § 3 (1869). See 1
WIGMORE, EvImENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 602.
4. See 1 WiGo, op. cit. supra note 3, § 488.
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various states.5 In Funk v. United States,6 however, the Court, two justices 'dissent-
ing, reversed a judgment excluding the favorable testimony of the wife of the accused
and declared that the rules of evidence in criminal trials in the federal courts should
hereafter be governed by "present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than
in accordance with some outworn !md antiquated rule of the past."
Shortly after the decision in the Funk case the Court found occasion to explain and
expand this rule. In Wolfle v. United States7 the prosecution had been permitted at
the trial to introduce the contents of a letter from the accused to his wife through the
testimony of a stenographer to whom the accused had dictated the letter. The re-
sulting conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals8 on the ground that
such testimony would have been admissible by statute in the courts of the state at
the time of its admission to the Union. But the Supreme Court, although it sustained
the conviction, specifically rejected the grounds adopted by the Court of Appeals
and declared that "common law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal
courts in the light of reason and experience" should be the determinants of the ad-
missibility of testimony as well as of the competency of witnesses.
While the outcome of both cases is clearly desirable, the decisions suggest the in-
quiry whether it would not have been more expedient for the Court to have reversed
its decision in United States v. Reid9 and to have reinterpreted Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,10 whereby the federal courts are authorized to adopt the rules
of evidence current in their state courts "in trials at common law," to apply to
criminal actions." The instant decisions offer to the federal courts as guides for
their determinations only "the light of general authority and sound reason."
12
Although in specific trials this principle may operate to admit serviceable testimony
which might be excluded under existing local rules, the door is opened for time-con-
suming appeals in any case where a party may find advantage in urging that the ad-
mission or rejection of testimony fails to accord with general authority. 13 A new
body of appellate decisions will thus be required to delimit the rule's application.
5. Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (1911); cf. Benson v. United States, supra
note 2. The language in Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189, 195 (1920), would
indicate that the common-law rule as it existed in 1789 controls the admissibility of a wife's
testimony in criminal trials in all the federal courts. But this case was not followed in
United States v. Rendleman, 18 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927), in which the testimony
of a wife had been admitted on the ground that this was permitted by the controlling law,
namely, that in force in the Washington courts at the time of the admission of that state
to the Union. See also Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567, 576 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919);
Tinsley v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 890, 895 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
6. 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933); noted in (1934) 28 IL. L. REv. 486 and (1934) 82 U. or PA.
L. REV. 406. The trial was had in the District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina. By statute of that state the testimony of a wife was admissible in all trials.
N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1931) § 1802.
7. 54 Sup. Ct. 279 (1934).
8. Wolfie v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
9. 12 How. 361 (U. S. 1851); cf. Jin Fuey Moylv. United States, supra note 5.
10. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1926).
11. See 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 6.
12. See Benson v. United States, supra note 2, at 335.
13. For an argument that "general law" exists only as it may be found in the statutes and
decisions of a particular jurisdiction, see dissent of Holmes, J. in Black & White Taxicab
& Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532 (1928).
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These cases do indicate, however, that the Court is no longer in favor of a doctrine
which has kept federal rules of evidence out of touch with modem trends. And it is
to be hoped that as a result Congress will at last see fit to amend the Judiciary Act
specifically to provide that current state rules Of evidence should apply in criminal as
well as in civil actions. The Court conceded in the instant decisions that state laws
as they are now formulated accord on the whole with its notions as to the basis of
admissibility best adapted to the ascertainment of the truth. Those rules, more-
over, are familiar to the bar practicing before the federal courts and a body of
appellate court decisions interpreting the statutory provisions is already in existence.
By carrying them over into federal practice the laborious process of creating a
separate federal law of evidence would be avoided, with the uncertainty inevitably at-
tendant during the period of its development.
POWER OF DomicmiLARY STATE TO TAx INCOME DERIVED FROM
FOREIGN REAL ESTATE
IN computing the income upon which plaintiff, a resident of New York, was sub-
ject to a state income tax, New York tax officials in 1929 included rents from real
estate in Ohio and profits from sale of a portion of that land. Plaintiff, apparently
relying on cases holding that real property situate without the state is not subject
to a property' or an inheritance 2 tax by the state of domicil, contested the tax.
The Appellate Division, accepting plaintiff's analogy, disapproved the tax on rents
from the Ohio land but upheld it on profits derived from the sale of the land, on
the theory that such profits, the result of a capital investment, were sufficiently
divorced from the land itself to be taxable by New York.3 On appeal from the
decision regarding rentals the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
4
The question of the power of states of domicil and of situs to impose taxes upon
an individual's income, considered thus far by only a few courts, will acquire added
importance as the adoption of personal income tax laws by more of the states sub-
jects taxpayers with increasing frequency to unreasonable tax burdens.5 In a few
states the legislatures themselves have already recognized the necessity for restric-
tions upon the scope of income taxes. Thus, some statutes tax residents only on
income arising within the state, 6 or, on the other hand, impose no tax whatever on
1. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
2. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
3. Pierson v. Lynch, 237 App. Div. 763, 263 N. Y. Supp. 259 (3d Dep't 1933).
4. People ex rel. Pierson v. Lynch, 263 N. Y. 19 (1933).
5. The following states now tax residents on their entire income and non-residents on
income the source of which is within the state. ARx. STAT. (Castle, Supp. 1931) § 10240d;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 61-2410, 61-2416, as amended by Idaho Laws 1933, c. 159,
pp. 245, 252; MAss. ANN. LAWS (1932) c. 62; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 5027; Mo. STAT.
ANN. (1929) § 10115; N. C. REv. AcTs (1931) § 7880 (127); N. D. Coan'. LAWS ANN.
(Supp. 1925) § 2346a, as amended by N. D. Laws 1933, c. 252; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 322,
§ 69-1503; S. C. CODE (1932) § 2437, as amended by S. C. Acts 1933, no. 406; TENN.
CODE (1932) § 1090; Vt. Laws 1931, Act. 17; VA. TAx CODE (1930) c. 6; WIs. STAT. (1931)
§ 71.01. For a discussion of rates see GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTIc E o MODERN
TAxATxox (1933).
6. Hawaii Laws 1932, p. 146, followed in Hill v. Carter, 47 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931); Okla. Laws 1933, c. 195, § 6.
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non-residents; 7 and two states, following the example of the federal government's
treatment of international double taxation,8 permit deduction of taxes paid to other
states on the same income.9 In the absence of such self-imposed legislative restric-
tions, a similar result may be effected by the state courts.' 0 Thus, the New York
court in the principal case denied the domiciliary state's jurisdiction to tax income
from realty located elsewhere; the New Hampshire court has approved a similar
conclusion with respect to tangible personal property;" and Massachusetts has
refused to tax a resident trustee because the cestui was domiciled in and had been
taxed by another state.'
2
But such limitations, imposed by the states upon themselves, will not prove an
effective cure for multi-state taxation when the restrictions imposed by different
states still allow overlapping taxation of the same income. A taxpayer whose
income has its source in a foreign state will not benefit from the domiciliary state's
failure to tax non-residents on income earned within the state, nor from the refusal
of the state where income was earned to tax residents on income earned without
the state. Moreover, it is hardly to be anticipated that all states will, either legis-
latively or judicially, admit restrictions upon their own income taxes. As in the
case of inheritance taxes,13 the Supreme Court will thus undoubtedly be asked to
determine proper limitations upon the power of the states to tax various kinds of
income, and to apply these limitations uniformly to all states.
The Supreme Court has already held, in separate cases, that income may be taxed
7. N. H. PuB. LAWs (1926) c. 65, §§ 2, 3, 10. Delaware and Utah limit the tax
on non-residents to income derived from trusts located in the state. Del. Laws 1929,
c. 8, §§ 2, 5; Utah Laws 1931, c. 44, §§ 3, 47.
8. 47 STAT. 211 (1932), 26 U. S. C. Supp. VI § 131 (a) (1) (1932).
9. Ga. Laws 1931 (Extra Sess.), Act 13, § 14 (a); N. Y. TAX LAW (1930) § 351.
10. The majority of state decisions, however, have as yet placed no restrictions on
the possibility of multi-state income taxation. Longyear v. Commissioner, 265 Mass. 585,
164 N. E. 459 (1929); People v. State Tax Commissioner, 218 App. Div. 1, 217 N. Y. Supp.
669 (3d Dep't 1926); Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. Tax Commission, 129 S. C. 4S0,
124 S. E. 761 (1924).
11. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N. H. 559, 149 At]. 321 (1930). A state may not tax
income from non-local sources earned before the taxpayer became a resident of the taxing
state. Hart v. Tax Commissioner, 240 Mass. 37, 132 N. E. 621 (1921). See Standard
Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), and Standard Oil Co. v.
Wisconsin Tax Commission, 197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85 (1929), disapproving a corporation
income tax on income from operations conducted without the state.
12. Hutchins v. Commissioner, 272 Mass. 422, 172 N. E. 605 (1930), noted in (1931)
31 CoL. L. REv. 173; State v. Hampel, 172 Wis. 67, 178 N. W. 244 (1920). Usually the
beneficiary and trustee of a trust may both be taxed by their respective domiciliary states.
Rowe v. Braden, 186 N. E. 20 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1932); Ross v. McCabe, 61 S. W.
(2d) 479 (Tenn. 1933); Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Widule, 164 Wis. 56, 159 N. W. 630 (1916);
cf. Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v. McCabe, 164 Tenn. 591, 51 S. W. (2d) 850
(1932), holding that a non-resident beneficiary of a trust may not be taxed even though
the trust and trustee are within the state. For a general discussion of all these cases,
see Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction oj Income (1931) 44 H~Av. L. Rav. 1075.
13. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 2; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928);
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U. S. 586 (1930); First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
both by the state of residence' 4 and by the state where the income is earned.15
But these holdings do not indicate that the Court will approve actual "double" taxa-
tion of the same income, for in neither of them had the second state attempted to
impose a tax. On the contrary, the position which the Court has taken in recent
years in cases dealing with inheritance taxation' 6 suggests that it disapproves of
imposition by different states of similar taxes upon the same interests in property,'
7
and that only one state will be granted the power to tax a given income. The de-
cision as to which state may tax will undoubtedly vary according to the facts
presented by the case in dispute. It can hardly be doubted that the Supreme Court,
should the issue arise, will agree with the decision of the New York court in the
principal case that only the state where land is situated may tax rent accruing
from it, on the theory that land is only taxable at its situs'8 and that rent, con-
sidered in law as a real property interest, is so close to the land as to partake of
its immunity from foreign taxation. 19 From a logical standpoint it would seem
that profits from the sale of foreign realty, held taxable by the state of domicil
in the instant case, pertain as closely to the land in their source as does income
from continuing use of the land. Certainly the exercise in New York of business
acumen in securing the sales profits, stressed by the lower New York court in
justification of the tax thereon, was equally essential in securing income from the
rental of the same realty. But the fact that when the land is disposed of the
sales price probably enters the hazy realm of completely intangible property in-
terests, in the form of a note or a credit against a bank, would probably impress
the Supreme Court, as it did the state court, with the practicability of attaching
that intangible interest to the person of the creditor for taxation purposes. Thus
the question raised by the second half of the instant decision points the way to
future disputes over multi-state taxation of different types of income, which the
Supreme Court will be forced to resolve in the light of practical rather than strictly
logical considerations.
20
14. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); Lawrence v. Mississippi, 2S6 U. S. 276
(1932), aff'g 162 Miss. 338, 137 So. 503 (1931), noted in (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 283.
15. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,
252 U. S. 60 (1920). The federal tax may be imposed on alien non-residents on income
derived from within the United States. DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1918).
16. See cases note 13, supra.
17. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1 (1930).
18. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 1.
19. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 581 (1895); Opinion of
the Justices, 220 Mass. 613, 624, 108 N. E. 570, 574 (1915); Redfield v. Fisher,- 135 Ore.
180, 292 Pac. 813 (1930).
20. For a further discussion of these issues, see HARDING, DouBLE TAXAT1ON OF PROPERTY
M INcOmE (1933); Kessler, Some Legal Problems in State Personal Income Taxation
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 759; Day, The Taxable Situs of Income (1932) 8 CORN. L. Q. 36;
Maguire, Relief from Double Taxation of Personal Incomes (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 757.
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